Game Over for France in Africa
The end of France's neocolonial empire and widespread loss of influence implicates more than just Paris.
by Ronan Wordsworth
January 16, 2025
“I think someone forgot to say thank you.”
This loaded statement, made by French President Emmanuel Macron at the 30th annual Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris, reveals much about the state of French foreign policy toward Africa. Not only does it signal the end of Macron’s revitalized outreach to France’s former colonies, but it also all but confirms what many already knew — that French influence in Africa has been all-but wiped out.
Marcon’s line is the culmination of a series of rebukes by West and Central African nations that, over the past year or so, have taken steps to remove French military assets from their territories. The situation, however, is more complex than it appears. This more than just a matter of former colonies throwing off the yolk of a colonizer. Many of the countries once close to France have turned to Russia for their security needs, much to the chagrin of other Western powers that continue to search for long-term viable and reliable partners for both economic and security development.
France has long maintained close ties to many of its former colonies. Economically, it holds sway in a range of sectors, including mining, logistics, telecommunications and finance. (Many local currencies are still denominated in the franc.) Over the years, Paris has worked closely with the political elite, some of whom have been in power for decades, and has solidified its presence through the establishment of military bases and associated deployments and training.
Naturally, France benefited greatly from the arrangement. There are many economic benefits to French companies, many of which are partially state-owned. It gave French products attractive export destinations that were secured by French troops, who were always on hand to protect the assets and interests of French companies. This only justified the large capital expenditure in costly deployments and establishing bases around the continent.
More recent developments reveal a less direct benefit. Around 2013-14, insurgencies in the Sahel triggered mass political instability that, in turn, triggered mass migration from sub-Saharan Africa to southern Europe. To contain the insurgencies, then, was to contain immigration and the social discontents it creates north of the Mediterranean. French military bases had strategic locations that could limit migratory opportunities.
The past year or so, however, has changed the status quo. The Central African Republic was the first to turn to Russia back in 2018. Since then, the three countries that would later form the so-called Alliance of the Sahel States – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – taken a similar path following military coups that resulted in the ousting of regimes friendly to Paris in favor of nominally more nationalist ones that, as it happens, have replaced French security assets with Russian security assets.
Other countries seem interested in following suit. Chad has signed initial agreements with Russia, even as it removes French and U.S. forces, while Senegal’s new president has spoken repeatedly of breaking neocolonial ties and removing foreign militaries from its territory. (The decision by Chad is an especially damaging blow.)
The last two remaining French outposts are in Gabon, which is currently ruled by a military junta following a coup, and Djibouti. Gabon should be considered at risk, but in truth it isn’t so important to Paris. With only 350 French troops there, Gabon is unable to help France project power in the region.
Djibouti is another story. France has had a military base there since 1977 and currently has five French naval and air bases, hosting 1,500 troops. It is thus vital for French power projection in the Indian Ocean. This likely explains Macron’s visit there last Christmas, and why a defense agreement was renewed last summer. For these reasons, Djibouti is the least likely to be dislodged from France’s sphere of influence.
For France, the consequences of losing its influence are many. Already, mass migration to Europe has resumed, and with Moscow ostensibly in charge of security, it won’t abate anytime soon. (Manipulating migration will give Moscow a lot of leverage in Europe.) China, meanwhile, is moving into mining operations and increasing trade ties to fill the void left by the hasty French departure.
But the bigger issue is that the situation in Francophone Africa implicates a bunch of other powers. Djibouti alone is home to military bases belonging to the U.S., Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Japan, Italy and Saudi Arabia. In countries like Niger, where France was the primary security partner, Germany and the U.S. now have to withdraw their troops predominantly through their association as foreign actors.
The U.S. is already looking for new strategic partners to help combat growing insurgencies. Militant Islamist group Boko Haram, for example, is resurgent in northeast Nigeria. In Benin, there have been multiple cross-border attacks on security forces by militant groups from Niger and Burkina Faso. Ghana, Ivory Coast and Togo are all facing threats from their northern borders as militant groups look to expand into the West African coastal regions, which would provide them a hub to improve logistics and financing.
In Algeria, conflict has resumed between Tuaregs, Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin, the Malian Defense Force and Wagner troops. Security has been enhanced at the border in the hope of avoiding spillover. The country is also grappling with a refugee crisis, sending record numbers of displaced Nigeriens back to their home country. The uptick owes overwhelmingly to the security vacuum created by the departure of Western security forces. (Niamey repealed a law that criminalized migrant trafficking.) Should this become a larger issue for North Africa, it will impact Europe with both security concerns and an increase in migrant crossings.
For Western companies, Francophone Africa is becoming an increasingly hostile environment. In Mali, local authorities have begun to crack down on foreign companies, restricting them under the auspice of “resource nationalism.” (Tellingly, Russian and Chinese firms are excluded from these restrictions.) Canadian mining firm Barrick Gold has frozen operations and will potentially withdraw from the market following export restrictions imposed on gold. Over the past week, the government has seized 3 tons of Barrick’s gold stocks, worth around $250 million. Arrests of executives of Barrick in December and of Australian mining company Resolute Mining in November – essentially for ransom – further evince the growing hostile investing environment. Barrick accounts for as much as 10 percent of Mali’s gross domestic product.
In Niger, a similar story is taking place. Resource nationalist policies have produced a hostile operating environment and are unlikely to change in the near term, resulting in a possible exodus of Western business. The economic fallout would certainly affect government coffers, but there are almost certainly a bunch of Russian and Chinese companies waiting to take their spots. On Tuesday, China’s National Petroleum Corporation signed an agreement to boost oil extraction following an initial agreement last year.
France will likely be the biggest loser here, while China and Russia will be the biggest beneficiaries. The situation has already begun to evolve from just encompassing French military bases to a larger political and economic problem that embroils much of the West.
— This essay originally appeared at Geopolitical Futures.
NOTE: Russia’s Syrian debacle greatly constrains Putin’s ability to pursue his African goals: he has not, and likely cannot, solve that problem. I address this in the following video, and the author of the above article also addresses it in the linked essay. Finally, Turkey is taking tremendous advantage of Russia’s troubles. — RDM
 |
|